Exterior Public Stairways are “Sidewalks” and Require Prior Written Notice of Defects

Hinton v Village of Pulaski

The Court of Appeals rules here that an exterior public stairway which connects a sidewalk with a municipal parking lot is the equivalent of a sidewalk, and therefore the municipality that owns it must have prior written notice of a defect as a condition precedent to liability for injuries.—LNR

The Village of Pulaski is a town of a few thousand people in Oswego County, NY, about ten minutes’ drive from Lake Ontario. This is fishing country, and the heart of this fishing county is Salmon River. “Unique in the Northeast, the Salmon River is an angler’s mecca. Thousands of trophy Chinook and coho salmon, steelhead, rainbows and brown trout, driven the by urge to spawn, run its length each year. Twelve miles of classic riffs, pools, and runs are accessible to those who would test its waters with rod and reel” (Oswego County Tourism, Visit Oswego County, New York: Where to Fish).

Locals will tell you the one of the best fishing spots on the Salmon River is the “Black Hole,” on the west end of Pulaski. The south bank is part of a salmon run, but the north bank is public.  At the peak of the season, hundreds of anglers ply the waters at the Black Hole. The throng regularly blocked the streets, so the Village installed signage directing anglers to park in an adjacent car park normally used by the Village Department of Public Works. From there, anglers must walk down a stairway, cross Riverview Drive, and walk further down the undeveloped bank before they reach the Black Hole. That stairway is the subject of this appeal. It is a “railway tie” stairway, made of compacted earth nosed with recycled railway ties, many of which still include the rusted nails they once had. The stairs are steep, irregularly spaced, with the space between the nosings made of grasses and muddy strands with potholes and muddy clumps (which were exacerbated due to a recent heavy rain). The railings were rickety and wooden, and at a low height; there was also less railing on one side than the other. The stairway was built by the Village.

Mr. Hinton, the plaintiff in this case, is a licensed fishing guide and owns a fishing lodge. He makes his living renting out rooms to anglers and taking them fishing. On October 19, 2013, at the height of the season, finding his schedule unexpectedly free, he decided to spend the afternoon fishing without clients. Although Mr. Hinton preferred less congested spots, he decided to give the Black Hole a try. He drove to the DPW parking lot as the signs instructed, gathered his things, and started down the stairway. About a third of the way down, he tripped—possibly over a rut in the stairs or one of the spikes protruding from the stairs—and went down head over heels. He broke his left ankle, severely injured his knee and suffered various sprains. As he explained in his deposition “my fishing season ended on that day,” costing him both medical bills and his livelihood. Faced with those serious financial consequences, Mr. Hinton sued the Village, alleging that the Village had allowed the stairs to deteriorate and become a hazard to members of the public, and that his injuries were caused by the Village’s negligent maintenance of the stairway.

The Village of Pulaski Code provides, in relevant part, that “no civil action shall be maintained” against defendant Village of Pulaski for personal injury sustained as a result of a defect in “any street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk” unless prior written notice of the alleged defect is provided to the Village (Village of Pulaski Code § 122-14; see also Village Law § 6-628). Plaintiff commenced this action against the Village after he fell while descending an exterior stairway that connects a public road to a municipal parking lot. The Village did not receive prior written notice of the alleged defect before plaintiff commenced suit, and the Village moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed.

In Woodson v City of New York, this Court determined that a stairway may be classified as a sidewalk for purposes of a prior written notice statute if it “functionally fulfills the same purpose that a standard sidewalk would serve” (93 NY2d 936, 937-938 [1999], citing Donnelly v Village of Perry, 88 AD2d 764, 765 [4th Dept 1982] [holding that steps between a roadway and public sidewalk were “the equivalent of a sidewalk” because they “provide(d) a passageway for the public”] and Youngblood v Village of Cazenovia, 118 Misc 2d 1020, 1022 [Sup Ct, Madison County 1982] [holding that steps are “essentially sidewalks laid on slopes, often connecting two stretches of sidewalk”], affd on opn below 93 AD2d 962 [3d Dept 1983]; see also Groninger v Village of Mamaroneck, 17 NY3d 125, 129 [2011] [parking lot served the “functional purpose” of a highway, thereby triggering a notice requirement]). 

In the twenty years since Woodson was decided, the Legislature — “though fully capable of corrective action” — has done nothing to “signal disapproval” of this interpretation (Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 29 NY3d 202, 225 [2017]). As the identical question has been long since resolved by this Court, the present case involves the application of settled precedent — not statutory interpretation (see Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Fitzgerald, 25 NY3d 799, 819-820 [2015] [noting that an “extraordinary and compelling justification is needed to overturn precedents involving statutory interpretation” because, “if the precedent or precedents have misinterpreted the legislative intention embodied in a statute, the Legislature’s competency to correct the misinterpretation is readily at hand”]; Matter of Eckart, 39 NY2d 493 [1976] [“Generally, once the courts have interpreted a statute any change in the rule will be left to the Legislature, particularly where the courts’ interpretation is a long-standing one”]; Heyert v Orange & Rockland Util., 17 NY2d 352, 360 [1966] [noting that “established precedents are not lightly to be set aside” because “the remedy (is) ordinarily with the Legislature”]; see also People v Taylor, 9 NY3d 129, 148 [2007] [“Stare decisis is deeply rooted in the precept that we are bound by a rule of law—not the personalities that interpret the law”]). We see no compelling reason to overrule our longstanding precedent.

The courts below correctly applied Woodson in holding that the stairway at issue “functionally fulfills the same purpose” as a standard sidewalk, and therefore plaintiff was required to show that the Village received prior written notice of the allegedly defective condition. In its motion for summary judgment, the Village established that plaintiff failed to plead or prove prior written notice. Plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact in opposition, and therefore summary judgment was properly awarded to the Village. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments lack merit or are unpreserved for review.

One dissenting judge noted that because the Village’s prior written notice law did not specify that it applied to stairways, the Court was wrong in deciding that a stairway can be a type of sidewalk.

2019 NY Slip Op 01261

Decided on February 21, 2019

Court of Appeals